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The Study of Mechanism of Mobilization for Mega Disaster — Taiwan Area 
                                                       Yu-Hsien Lee, Chun-Nen Huang
                                                        Central Police University
 ABSTRACT Mega disaster refers to a serious event hat is over-scaled or compound, which would require 
extraordinary efforts to management. Therefore, the efficiency of mobilization mechanism would be 
essential to a nation. The mobilization includes man powers, supplies (equipment), economy and other 
several categories, to achieve the goal in managing and recovering disaster, each process of mobilizing 
should be coordinated. As a result, this paper is aiming to locate the effective strategies of disaster 
management i  order to extend the capability in responding mega disasters of government in Taiwan. By 
reviewing the recently occurred hazard, the Katrina Hurricane and the 311 Earthquake, this paper identifies 
the main problems of the management of disaster in both countries. In hence, the comparison of the 
responding timeline between America and Japan is also concluded. With realizing the limitation of the 
mobilization mechanism, this paper provides the ideal mechanism inmobilizing includes the process and the 
time line to achieve the purpose of this paper.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobilization mechanism.
   Facing the traumatic hange of climate, the 
whole world should be alerted. Same as Taiwan, 
from the experiences of the past mega events, a 
well-development governmental system should be 
established under a great hazard. Especially now, the 
whole world is facing not just a single disaster like 
hurricane; instead, awidespread compound isaster, 
which might cover more than one region, also, 
constructed by more than one disaster. 
    A well-organized isaster esponding system 
should include pre-disaster prevention, disaster 
response and post-disaster recovery. Therefore, 
through reviewing the experiences from other 
countries and Taiwan, this paper is aiming to exam 
the mobilization mechanism under disaster and the 
post-disaster recovery of Taiwan; in hence, viewing 
the system of disaster prevention and management to 
ensure the disaster-responding efficiency in Taiwan.
Overall, this paper is looking for: 
    A. The organization of mobilization. 
    B. The process of mobilization. 
   C. The limitation of mobilization. 
   With the expectation of providing an overview 
of the mobilization system in Taiwan, this paper 
aims to locate the effective strategies of disaster 
management in order to extend the capability in 
responding mega disasters of government in Taiwan.
2. DEFINITION
2.1 Mega Disaster 
    Accordingly, the criteria of emerge disaster 
includes the number of the death, injured, missing 
and refugee that relates to the disaster. Also, the 
number of destroyed, affected households i included. 
Hence, the time and location of occurrence and the 
function of the living systems are in counted. Overall, 
the compound disaster that occurred in Japan
included several components: non-single disaster, the 
effect of the infrastructures and the mobilization of 
local governments. 
   In Noji (1996), the compound isaster refers to 
"NA-TECHS", which indicates the occurrence of a 
natural disaster or event that relatively cause 
second-injured due to the vulnerability of social 
environment. For example, the earthquake happened 
in Japan firstly provoked the tsunami, and results the 
major fire incidents and radiation crisis due to the 
vulnerable infrastructures. Shih et al. (2002) on the 
other hand exclude the number of affected human 
and properties and define the compound isaster as 
one predictably significant lost, in which would cost 
all nations' power from governments and non-profit 
organizations for a long period to be recovered. 
   Consequently, concludes all approaches, this 
paper defines the "mega disaster" with several 
components:
A.
B.
C.
D.
Non-single disaster: more than one natural 
disaster that occurred at same region in a short 
period, which might relatively provoke one and 
other disaster within the same time. 
Unpredicted disaster scale: the scale of the 
disaster is over one region's prediction that 
results the unadapted and unbearable 
consequence of the region. 
Compound disaster: the second impact from 
the vulnerability of the infrastructures relates to 
a natural disaster. That is, besides the crash 
from the disaster itself, the region would suffer 
another impact from the fragile infrastructures 
resulted by the disaster. 
Over-estimated impact: the impact of the 
disaster is over-estimated, includes the 
uncountable number of affected people,
E.
households and the impact of infrastructures 
that leads to the dysfunction of the society for a 
while. 
A long period and large scale of 
mobilization: the impact of the disaster 
requires a wide region of mobilization from all 
departments, also a long period of time to meet 
the resilience.
2.2 Mobilization 
   Generally, the concept of mobilization involves 
the power of military force. That is, the support from 
military while the nation facing threaten toward the 
function or the chaos of wide region. In mobilization, 
the preparation would be the major stage, which 
focuses on the early readiness before war or emerge. 
Two stages should be included; one is the 
preparation of peacetime, and another is for the 
wartime. For the peacetime, the preparation requires 
a long-period of time and thoroughly considered 
plan to adopt future possible war; on the other hand, 
the preparation for wartime is the emerge response 
toward the up-coming war. 
    Besides the arrangement of military, 
mobilization still depends on the whole nation's 
power. According to the Ministry of National 
Defense in Taiwan (2011), the mobilization refers to 
the use of all nation resources include man power, 
economy, technology, spirit and others to keep the 
nation steady while adapting emerge situation, such 
as war or hazard. It also can be divided into two 
main parts: administrative mobilization and military 
mobilization. The general definition of mobilization 
refers to the process of gathering all nations' 
resources by the cooperation of each administration 
session; meanwhile, through the lead and arrange of 
military to ensure the efficiency of nations' power.
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   Specifically, in disaster prevention and response, 
the mobilization mainly focuses on the process of 
gathering the emergency responding sources from 
each government stage, local responding sector and 
organization after the declaration of disaster. 
According to the National Responding Plan (NRP) 
of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
mobilization is the inception, integration and 
operation of every governmental division in 
responding and supporting an event (Wu et al., 2007). 
Therefore, in responding disaster, the mobilization 
requires an overall interaction from government o 
the responding sectors, through the public to the 
private.
2.3 Mobilization system in Taiwan 
   The disaster prevention system in Taiwan is 
three-level (central government, county/city and 
country/ local government) process. While disaster, 
the local government would be the first responding 
line to the disaster; if the damage of disaster is over 
the capability of local government, the local 
government should request further help from higher 
level (second-level). Basically, the process of 
mobilization in Taiwan could follow this rule. Like 
chart 1 show, when one region swept by the disaster, 
the local government should be the primary 
responding session; meanwhile, the non-profit 
organization get involved. Secondary stage is when
the local government is no longer be able to respond 
the damage, the nearest region government should 
respond to the request of the disaster area to provide 
assistance. However, if the secondary assistance is 
still not capable to control the damage, the central 
government would need to be involved. Moreover, 
the assistance from military will be attended after the 
central government is invested, in which, the full 
process of mobilization system is constructed. 
3. REVIEWS
   To understand the mobilization process of other 
countries, this paper eviews two major disasters that 
occurred in recent years. One is the Katrina 
hurricane in the United State, 2005 and another is the 
unprecedented earthquake in Japan, 2011. The 
following tables will illustrate the details of each 
disaster and the responding timeline of US 
government, Japanese government and Taiwan. 
   In 2005, the hurricane Katrina lashed the 
southeast of America and caused unprecedented 
damage of the area. Besides the impact of the 
hurricane itself, it also led to the dysfunction of 
electricity and communication system, which cost 
300 billion US dollars lost. In total, the US 
government mobilized over 30,000 manpower and 
dozens of rescuer teams; also, the warships to assist 
in responding damage (Table 1). 
Table 1. The details of Katrina Hurricane.
  Location 
   Time 
Death/  Injured/ 
  Missing 
  Refugee 
 Other effect
United State 
2005. 08. 23. 
656 deaths.
     96,178 people. 
Dysfunction of electricity and
Economy Lost 
 Manpower
Equipment 
Foreign aid
     communication system. 
    300 billion US dollars. 
About 30,000 national guards and 39 
      medical rescue teams. 
         5 warships.
                Yes.
   On the other hand, the unforeseen earthquake 
and the relatively provoked tsunami devastated the 
northern east of Japan on March  11th, 2011 (Table 2). 
The grant damage results more than 10,000 deaths 
and over 20 trillion lost, also, the crash of oil 
refinery and the damage of nuclear power plant. The 
mobilization process continually proceeds since 
March 11th until August 31 th, the total mobilized 
numbers include: 10 million self-defense forces, 
13,906 tons of supplies, 32,985 tons of water and 
5,005,484 packs of foods. In order to compare, this 
paper lists out the first nine days of mobilization 
process of self-defense forces in Japan. 
Table 2. The details of 311 Earthquake.
  Location 
   Time 
 Death/ Injured/ 
  Missing 
  Refugee 
 Other effect 
Economy Lost
Manpower 
Supplies
311 Earthquake
          Japan 
        2011.03. 11. 
15,828 deaths, 3,754 missing and 
       5,942 injured. 
    About 14,000 people. 
    Level 5 Radiation crisis. 
15' -25 trillion Yen (Japanese 
          dollars). 
  10 millionself-defense forces 
13,906 tons of supplies, 32,985 tons 
 of water and 5,005,484 packof 
            foods.
Equipment 
Foreign aid
fts and 53 warships. 
Yes.
   Overall, as Table 3 demonstrates, it can be seem 
that the path of US government in responding 
Katrina was lagged behind. For both countries, 
several problems that related to the mobilization 
mechanism are pointed out (Chu and Chang, 2009; 
Yang,  2010  ; Kang and Xiang, 2011): 
A. The reduction to FEMA's capability in 
   responding hazard. 
   After FEMA has been merged into the 
Department of Defense (DoD) in 2003, it leads to 
two main concerns. 
   a. As the DoD put more focus on the defense 
        of national security, the budget for 
        FEMA was sharply curtailed. 
   b. The cause of FEMA's relegation to 
         secondary status. 
B. Incomplete evacuation plan. 
   The evacuation plan in New Orleans was 
incomplete, which resulted the evacuators had to 
stay in the unprepared place without enough needed 
supplies. 
C. The lack of coordination in responding and 
   managing disaster. 
  The New Orleans city had made a late 
declaration, which delayed the response from 
high-level government resulted a period of dark time 
of the city. 
D. The communication gap between divisions. 
    a. Central government vs. local government — 
        the unclear communication system 
        between each level of government 
       decreased the efficiency of managing 
         disaster. 
    b. Local government vs. citizens — the lack of 
       communication between local 
        government and citizens would causethe
        satisfaction of citizens. 
E. The difficulties of delivering supplies.
F.
a.
b.
The complex delivery system — the 
 supplies delivery systems in Japan are 
 well organized but complex. The 
 government would firstly request for the 
 needed supplies from other divisions and 
 private organizations, the goods would 
 deliver to the county supplies depots; 
 afterward, those goods would attribute to 
 each country and finally deliver to the 
 disaster area under the arrange of 
 countries. This complex delivery system 
 once blocked the supply system, 
 fortunately, the application of logistic 
 released part of the predicament later. 
The undeliverable disaster area — due to the 
 mega disaster, a large scale of land 
 transportation was destroyed, which 
 disrupted the operation of the delivery 
 systems.
Poor information transmission.
   The dysfunction of electricity system would 
lead to the unclear information transmission, which 
could mislead the central government in 
decision-making. However, in recent years, the 
development of wireless Internet and mobile 
communication provide another way to collect and 
broadcast the information. 
G. The treatment to minority groups. 
From the experience of Japan, most of the death and 
injured were elders or physically disabled, same as 
in the US, during Katrina, the US government has 
been criticized for being ignorance to the 
African-Americans in New Orleans. In which allows 
us to consider the treatment ofthose minorities.
Table 3. The comparison of Katrina Hurricane and 
311 Earthquake.
Day Responding Process Responding Process
Event
 1
(US)
Katrina Hurricane
2005. 8. 26. 
 • The Governor of 
    Louisiana 
    declared the 
    emergency 
   existsof 
    Louisiana and 
   startedto 
    operate the 
    military force to 
    assisting 
     disaster. 
• Meanwhile, the 
    declaration of 
    Mississippi; 
   also,the 
    operation of 
    military force.
(Japan)
311 Earthquake
2011.
•
•
•
•
•
•
3. 11. 
The official 
residence 
responding 
session 
established. 
The 
requesting for 
sending 
self-defense 
forces to 
assist disaster 
area. 
The 
emergency 
responding 
session 
established. 
The Tokyo 
fire 
department 
sent rescue 
teams. 
The 
declaration of 
Radiation 
crisis. 
Operating 
great quantity 
of 
self-defense 
forces, police, 
firefighter 
and medical
specialties in gas stop. of food.
rescuing
• About 10,000
mission.
people refuge in
• Total number the superdome.
of mobilized
aircrafts: 25 4 2005. 8. 29. 2011  . 3. 14.
 • Evacuated about
• Total number
2 2005. 8.27. 2011 . 3. 12. 80% citizens,
of mobilized
and about
• President Bush • Total number self-defense
37,091 refugees
declared of mobilized
in total.
force: 66,000
Louisiana and self-defense people.
Mississippi force: 20,000
• Solders and
FEMA were in • Total number
States of people.
an armed state. of mobilized
Emergency.
• Total number aircrafts: 96
of mobilized helicopters
aircrafts: 190. and7
aircrafts.
• Total number
of mobilized • Total number
warships: 45. of mobilized
warships: 58
• Total number
warships.
of other
supplies: • Total number
1,500 towels of other
and 1,200
supplies: dry
batteries,
cans.
water (140L +
170 L ) ,
3 2005. 8.28. 2011 . 3. 13.
foods,
• The preparation  • Total number preserved
of disaster-relief of mobilized
foods and
other
supplies by self-defense
supplies.
FEMAin force: 50,000
Georgia and people. 5 2005. 8. 30. 2011 . 3. 15.
Texas.
• Total number • The Pentagon
• Total number
• The evacuation of other announced
of mobilized
caused people supplies: sending 5
self-defense
stocked in the 50,000 pack warships to the
force: 70,000
disaster area.
2005. 9. 3. 
 • Dispatched 
    10,000 national 
   guards to 
     disaster area. 
 • 96,178 total 
    refugees
3. 19. 
Total number 
of mobilized 
self-defense 
force: 
106,000 
people. 
Total number 
of mobilized 
aircrafts: 209 
helicopters 
and 321 
aircrafts. 
Total number 
of mobilized 
warships: 57 
warships. 
Total number 
of other 
supplies: 600 
kg ingredients 
and other 
supplies.
From: National Science and Technology Center of 
Disaster Reduction. (2005 & 2011).; Cabinet office, 
government of Japan (2011).
4. RESULT
    Fortunately, Taiwan did not encounter any 
mega disaster until now; considering the global 
warming and relative disaster, it is necessary to be 
well prepared. From the past experience, the 
performance of responding time and the capability in 
disaster responding were acceptable. However, the 
opportunity of facing major disaster should be
considered. Based on the experiences from 
countries and Taiwan, several issues are listed: 
A. The ambiguity of the authority in 
    government level.
a.
b.
other
each
The disaster prevention and management 
mechanism in Taiwan is basically 
following the system of Japan. However, 
the three-level governance might meet the 
obstacle due to the poor function of local 
government (third-level). 
 The unclear distinction between 
responsibility and accountability of central 
government and local government that 
confused the chain of command.
B. Inefficient communication between divisions. 
    During disaster, it requires the horizontal and 
vertical communication between departments in 
order to ensure the smooth of the responding; 
however, from the reality, the poor communication 
between each division has delayed the responding 
time for cooperating. 
C. The failure of information transmission. 
    From the experience, the information 
transmission system was not successfully operate, 
which led to the failure of providing supplies. For 
instance, the supplies from central government were 
unusable that would eventually heaped up, which 
could waste more man power to collect. 
D. The lack of a unify disaster management 
    plan. 
     The experience shows that due to the lack of 
unify plan, the incoordination between central and 
local government delayed the mobilizing process for 
extra communications. 
E. The suitability of military force in managing 
    disaster. 
     From the past experience from other 
countries and Taiwan, the military force plays an
essential role in managing disaster. However, it 
should be considered that national defense should be 
the main function of militaries. Therefore, the 
process of involving disaster management might 
disperse the power of military force (Chang, 2009). 
F. The incomplete supplies mobilizing systems. 
   Unlike Japan, the supplies mobilizing system in 
Taiwan is not as organized. The shortage of depots 
confused the donators and the suppliers, which 
spread out the energy of resources. Besides, the 
delivery system is another issue in mobilizing 
supplies. That is, how to deliver the supplies under 
the dysfunction of transportation situation. 
G. The poor management of volunteers. 
   During disaster, all volunteers would crow into 
the disaster area, which could disrupt the order of the 
scene. Moreover, it might lead some extra cost of 
resources in arranging those volunteers.
5. CONCLUSION
   The mobilization mechnism plays an important 
role in disaster management and prevention. From 
reviewing literature and collecting the data of recent 
disasters, this paper points out several problems of 
moblization system in Taiwan. Above all, this paper 
provides some suggestions for improving the 
mobilization mechism in Taiwan. 
   First of all, the time of responding is essential. 
From the experience of Katrina hurricane, it is clear 
that the response to the disaster should be timely to 
avioding further damage. As a result, this paper 
provides a timeline to clarify the suitable disaster 
manging (Figure 2). As the  figure shows, 
considering about the capability of Taiwan, the 
assumption that the supply of the supplies could 
achieve 100% 3 days after the disaster by our own 
can be made; however, after the fourth day, the 
supply system would start to drop down, in which, it
is necessary to import the forigen aid to support.
The Ideal completement of Supplies 
        Mobilization
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Figure2. The ideal completement of supplies 
mobilization.
   Also, to ensure the capability of the 
mobilization mechnism, this paper indicates an ideal 
mechnism in operating mobilization during disaster. 
As the figure indicates, the mobilization inculdes 
two main parts: supplies and equipments. While the 
disaster occurs, due to the unclear situation, the local 
government of the affected area would primary need 
be prepared for providing the ugently needed 
supplies (include foods and water). If the impact is 
higher than the region's bearability, the region could 
apply for the assistance from nearest county by rules. 
Meanwhile, the operation of non-profit organization 
get involved to support the affected area. Besides, 
the military usually stored certain amount of 
supplies; hence, the wider space for reserving goods 
and refugees, the use of military force would be 
critically helpful. 
                             r Affected Area -1
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Figure 3. The ideal mobilization process.
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